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War appears to be, or threatens to be, not so much a contest of
strength as one of endurance, nerve, obstinacy, and pain. It appears
to be, and threatens to be, not so much a contest of military strength
as a bargaining process—dirty, extortionate, and often quite reluc-
tant bargaining on one side or both—nevertheless a bargaining
process.1
INTRODUCTION
Starving themselves for rights allegedly denied to them by the
British government, hundreds of imprisoned nationalists protested
the Crown in 1981.2 The republican prisoners refused food, clothing,
and cleanliness to force British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
to meet a litany of demands.3 Publicly, the Prime Minister
denounced the strikes and firmly stated that her nation maintained
an unyielding policy: the United Kingdom does not negotiate with
terrorists.4 Yet, documents from the period recently made public
indicate that Thatcher secretly negotiated with Irish Republican
Army leadership to bring about a conclusion of the strikes.5 These
talks demanded a cessation of the hunger strike in exchange for
limited concessions detailed by Parliament.6 Ultimately, these over-
tures at settlement were rebuffed and the hunger strike resolved of
its own volition.7 Several decades elapsed before the British and the
Irish separatists fashioned a workable peace through negotiation.
In light of this microcosmic example, and in the face of heinous
acts of terror and dissident disruptions, Western democracies—
namely the United Kingdom and the United States—stand resolute
1. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 7 (2008).
2. See PADRAIG O’MALLEY, BITING AT THE GRAVE: THE IRISH HUNGER STRIKES AND THE
POLITICS OF DESPAIR 6-9 (1990) (setting the scene for the hunger strikes).
3. Id. The prisoners issued “five demands” that included the right “to wear their own
clothes; to refrain from prison work; to have free association with other prisoners ...; to organ-
ize recreation and leisure activity ...; and to have remission ... restored.” DAVID BERESFORD,
TEN MEN DEAD: THE STORY OF THE 1981 IRISH HUNGER STRIKE 27 (1987).
4. Margaret Thatcher “Negotiated with IRA,” BBC NEWS (Dec. 30, 2011, 10:46 PM), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-16366413 [http://perma.cc/YF2U-9Q4N].
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. See BERESFORD, supra note 3, at 331 (“Even the Guardian, long respected in Ireland
for its understanding of the island’s woes, said: ‘The Government has overcome the hunger
strikes by a show of resolute determination not to be bullied.’”). 
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and publicly refuse negotiations. Adopting economic sanctions and
waging war to cripple dissident groups have been the preferred
methods for addressing the vexing problem presented by extremists.
Yet, as the number and frequency of terrorist attacks remain on the
rise, the efficacy of this hardline approach deserves objective evalua-
tion.8 This Note argues that the United States should abandon its
antiquated and myopic policy of refusing to negotiate with terrorist
organizations. Instead, the United States should adopt a clear policy
of active negotiations with dissident groups in order to reach
agreements that further American interests and mollify terrorist
activities. This Note suggests—as very few commentators to date
have—that such a policy of alternative dispute resolution may be
effectively used in tandem with America’s economic and military
might to dismantle extremist threats to the United States.9 
In order to illustrate both the feasibility and the benefits of a pol-
icy of negotiating with terrorists, this Note employs a two-part case
study. What follows focuses on the lessons garnered from the British
experience with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and
explains how the United States might adopt a similar strategy in its
war against al-Qaeda. This Note is divided into several sections to
facilitate the connection of these empirical dots. Part I addresses the
terms and definitions at work in this Note, defining terrorists,
terrorism, and negotiations. Part II provides a detailed look at the
actors involved in the formulation of this alternative policy through
8. See Riaz Hassan, Global Rise of Suicide Terrorism, 36 ASIAN J. SOC. SCI. 271, 272
(2008) (discussing the “acceleration of suicide attacks”).
9. Scores of scholars have posited hundreds of strategies for dealing with the rise of
terrorism in the modern age. See generally CINDY C. COMBS, TERRORISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 2-3, 9, 285-86 (3d ed. 2003); ALEX P. SCHMID, POLITICAL TERRORISM 239-41 (1983);
Philip B. Heymann, Dealing with Terrorism, 26 INT’L SECURITY 24, 25 (2001). Many
prominent academics urge prolonged conflict, while others stress a course of abstention. See,
e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPOND-
ING TO THE CHALLENGE 2-3, 11-12 (2002); BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, TERRORISM: HOW THE WEST
CAN WIN 3-4 (1986). Only a handful of individuals have called for a centrist approach of
durable engagement. See generally F.J. HACKER, CRUSADERS, CRIMINALS, CRAZIES: TERROR
AND TERRORISM IN OUR TIME 310-11 (1976) (arguing that correction of political injustices in
the world may reduce terrorist acts); Symposium, Negotiating with Terrorists and Non-State
Actors: The Journey to World Peace, 4 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 2 (2003) (posing
cost-benefit analysis to counterterrorism operations). This Note uniquely, albeit modestly,
adds to that important and growing body of scholarship.
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an examination of the United States, the United Kingdom, the
PIRA, and al-Qaeda. Part III explores how the British defused a
century-long war with Irish nationalists through negotiations, while
Part IV applies the lessons gleaned from the Anglo-Irish experience
to America’s relationship with al-Qaeda. Finally, Part V responds
to three prominent critiques of the policy advanced by this Note.
I. LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS AND TERMS OF ART
The legal system in America is commonly known to thrive on
the adversarial practice of law.10 Lawyers are seen to argue pas-
sionately before an impartial party, who determines winners and
losers under the law.11 Yet, such an all-or-nothing approach is rap-
idly waning, as fewer and fewer cases are formally tried before
the bench.12 Instead, an increasing number of cases are resolved
through alternative means of dispute resolution, including
negotiations, arbitrations, and mediations.13
Yet, while the legal field rapidly trends away from pure con-
frontation and towards reasoned, cost-effective bargaining, the
American nation at large remains resistant to notions of open dia-
logue and mutual gain in foreign policy. In fact, when addressing
the grave concern of terrorism, the United States repeatedly and
specifically singles out and proscribes negotiation as a viable policy
option: “there will be no negotiations with terrorists of any kind.”14
Discarding this particular policy mantra in favor of a more flex-
ible, negotiation-centric strategic regime forms the crux of this
10. See LARRY L. TEPLY ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, TEXT, NOTES, AND PROBLEMS 11-
12 (2d ed. 2008); see also THEODORE L. KUBICEK, ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: AMERICA’S COURT
SYSTEM ON TRIAL 6 (2006) (criticizing America’s adversarial system).
11. TEPLEY ET AL., supra note 10, at 11.
12. ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 8-9 (2009); Albert W. Alschuler,
The Vanishing Civil Jury, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 5 (describing the civil trial as being “on
its deathbed, or close to it”). 
13. A sample taken in 2002 demonstrated that no more than 2 percent of civil cases and
5 percent of criminal cases ever go to trial. Pat V. Tremmel, Much Celebrated American Trial
Is Dying in Real Life, NW. UNIV. (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/
stories/2009/03/burnstrial.html [http://perma.cc/QA4Q-PQCM].
14. Jason Koebler, Why Governments Should Negotiate with Terrorists, U.S. NEWS
(July 31, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/07/31/why-governments-
should-negotiate-with-terrorists [http://perma.cc/6THY-XAPN].
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Note’s proposal. To achieve this end, some baseline definitions
should be established for the sake of conceptual clarity.
A. “Terrorist Group” and “Terrorism”
Despite the immense body of nuanced scholarship that attends
defining a term like “terrorist group” or “terrorism,” this Note elects
a streamlined definition for ease of discussion.15 As this Note ad-
dresses American interaction with terrorist groups, the definition of
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)—as advanced by the U.S.
Department of State—will be adopted for purposes of the analysis
below.16 The relevant statutory framework requires that a target
group (1) “must be a foreign organization,” (2) “must engage in ter-
rorist activity ... or terrorism ... or retain the capability and intent
to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism,” and (3) such “terrorist
activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or
the national security ... of the United States.”17 
For the purposes of the case study below, al-Qaeda was
designated an FTO in 1999.18 Although the State Department has
not designated the PIRA as an FTO, several related Irish
nationalist groups—the Real Irish Republican Army and the
Continuity Irish Republican Army—have been so classified.19
15. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566, at 2 (Oct. 8, 2004) (defining
international terrorism); BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-5 (2006)
(defining terrorism); Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a
Legal Concept in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation,
29 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 23, 25 (2006) (same).
16. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 9, 2002), https://josephhall.
org/export/US_Dept_State_FTO_site.pdf [http://perma.cc/85UQ-A35P].
17. Id. The statute contemplates threats to national security as those against “national
defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests [ ] of the United States.” Id. Additionally,
the Act defines “terrorist activity” as the commission of hijackings, the perpetration of hostage
taking or assassination, and the use of biological, chemical, nuclear, or incendiary devices
“with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to
cause substantial damage to property.” Id.
18. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.state.
gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm [http://perma.cc/67CJ-SA5S]. FTO status expires every two
years with the option to extend vested in the Secretary of State. Id. At no time has al-Qaeda’s
status as an FTO ceased since its original designation. Id. 
19. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., TERRORIST ORGANIZATION REFERENCE GUIDE, at i-ii (2004), available at http://perma.cc/
C75H-8ESZ.
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Nevertheless, al-Qaeda and the PIRA share identical status under
the statutory definition.20
B. “Negotiation”
Defining the field of negotiation is perhaps less tricky, but cer-
tainly as reductive as defining terrorism. Generally, negotiation
involves the “deliberation, discussion, or conference upon the terms
of a proposed agreement.”21 Roger Fisher and William Ury pose a
simplified formula at the outset of their seminal guide to
negotiating strategies: “Each side takes a position, argues for it, and
makes concessions to reach a compromise.”22 
As this Note addresses the relation between state and nonstate
actors as parties to the negotiation process, it may prove worth-
while to impose a limited foreign policy gloss on the simple
definition of negotiation. Nations rely strongly on formal and
informal channels of diplomatic relations among and between
themselves. Yet, this is not the only manner in which state actors
communicate. States often, if not constantly, engage in tacit
bargaining processes, in which non-rhetorical posturing and
behavior signal policy preferences, choices, and goals.23 As nonstate
actors, by definition, lack the apparatus for handling direct
diplomatic communications, so tacit bargaining proves essential to
states attempting to engage with nonstate entities.24 The case
studies that underpin this Note lean heavily on notions of both
formal and tacit bargaining as a means of effecting state-to-nonstate
negotiations.
20. Immigration and Nationality Act § 219, 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012).
21. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1036 (6th ed. 2009).
22. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 3 (3d ed. 2011).
23. George W. Downs & David M. Rocke, Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control, 39 WORLD
POL. 297, 297 (1987) (“A state bargains tacitly with another state when it attempts to
manipulate the latter’s policy choices through its behavior rather than by relying on formal
or informal diplomatic exchanges.”). 
24. See id. at 298-99. 
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II. THE ACTORS
This Note will largely focus on four geopolitical entities: the Unit-
ed States, the United Kingdom, the Provisional Irish Republican
Army (PIRA), and al-Qaeda. Clearly, the former two are state
actors, while the latter two are nonstate organizations.
Understanding the organizational structure and the relevant
history—as pertinent to the issue at hand—of these actors is a
necessary predicate of the analysis to follow.
A. State Actors: The United States and the United Kingdom
Unlike the nonstate actors in this Note, the state actors here
discussed are readily understood through common experience,
and a discussion of the three branches of American government
or the British constitutional monarchy would serve little purpose.
Yet, it may prove worthwhile to classify these two nations, as does
Robert Pape, as liberal democracies.25 This classification proves
relevant in the context of state reactions to the tactics of terror-
ism, as liberal democracies prove the overwhelming targets of
suicide bombings perpetrated by terrorist organizations.26 Pape
has offered three explanations for this phenomenon.27 First, Pape
suggests that liberal democracies are viewed by terrorist organ-
izations as “soft” targets in that their “publics have low thresholds
of cost tolerance and high ability to affect state policy.”28 Second,
democratic states tend to react cautiously when dealing with threats
to security and are slow to retaliate.29 Finally, unlike authoritarian
regimes, liberal governments, almost by definition, afford wide lat-
itude to those who wish to publicize, organize, and perpetrate
dissident agendas.30 While these factors unfortunately place liberal
25. Robert A. Pape, The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343,
350 (2003).
26. Id. at 347 (“[A]ll suicide terrorist campaigns in the last two decades have been aimed
at democracies, which make more suitable targets from the terrorists’ point of view.”).
27. Id. at 349-50.
28. Id. at 349.
29. Id. at 350.
30. See id. 
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democracies in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations, they each
may serve a greater end in facilitating effective negotiations with
groups set on achieving policy aims through coercive violence. That
is to say that having durable democratic institutions backed by
popular sentiment seems to create an atmosphere ripe for seeking
state interests through negotiation. By actively engaging in dialogue
with terrorists, liberal governments limit the effectiveness of ex-
treme bargaining tactics and emphasize the critical importance of
reasoned concession.
B. Provisional Irish Republican Army
Springing fully formed from the defunct corpse of the Old Irish
Republican Army (IRA) in the early twentieth century, the
Provisional Irish Republican Army eschewed reconciliation with the
British government and waged a protracted guerrilla war for nearly
fifty years before reticently laying down its arms at the foot of the
negotiating table.31 During this period—from its formation in 1969
to the decommissioning of its arms in 2005—the PIRA perpetrated
dozens of terrorist acts that left nearly 2000 individuals dead and
accounted for nearly 50 percent of the casualties during the Anglo-
Irish conflict.32
This Section’s analysis of the PIRA is bifurcated. The first seg-
ment treats the historical context within which the Anglo-Irish
conflict took shape, while the second portion examines the relevant
organizational structure of the PIRA. As a mild disclaimer: it may
be of no surprise that several facts below appear reductive and
compressed in light of the nuance and complexity of a conflict that
31. See generally DAVID MCKITTRICK & DAVID MCVEA, MAKING SENSE OF THE TROUBLES:
THE STORY OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND, at ix-xi (2002) (discussing the trajectory
of the Anglo-Irish conflict).
32. MALCOLM SUTTON, BEAR IN MIND THESE DEAD: AN INDEX OF DEATHS FROM THE
CONFLICT IN IRELAND, 1969-1993, at 95-97 (1994), available at http://perma.cc/QFB6-D22R
(indicating 2058 killings committed by Republican Paramilitary groups during the period
stated, with nearly 89 percent of that total stemming from PIRA violence); Brian Lavery,
I.R.A. Apologizes for Civilian Deaths in Its 30-Year Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/17/world/ira-apologizes-for-civilian-deaths-in-its-30-year-
campaign.html [http://perma.cc/BL2D-MHN4] (indicating 650 civilian deaths, in contrast to
paramilitary or security forces).
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has raged hot and cold for centuries.33 What follows is merely a
thumbnail sketch that necessarily does little justice to the
harrowing geopolitical narrative tragically penned in English and
Irish blood for the better part of the last few centuries.
1. Historical Background
The roots of the Irish nationalist agenda are widely studied,
deeply contested, and constantly revised by each passing generation.
Most scholars have traced the seeds of subjugation and the
formation of the nationalist agenda to the earliest contact between
the British Crown and the Emerald Isle.34 As early as the
seventeenth century, the English effectively colonized Ireland,
confiscating land and installing Protestant “plantations” from which
to foster an Anglican identity.35 Centuries of such cultural and
political subjugation reached a fever pitch around the turn of the
twentieth century, as the Crown sought to firmly advance a
thoroughly English agenda on an increasingly hostile and
marginalized native population. 
Seeking to forestall being wholly subsumed into the British Em-
pire, several Irish elite proposed a series of bills to the British Par-
liament in an effort to effect a system of Home Rule—by which the
Irish would have a say in Anglo-Irish policy making from within
Great Britain’s decision-making body itself.36 Needless to say, such
political measures faced stiff resistance in the corridors of English
power, with the First Home Rule Bill defeated on the floor of the
House of Commons.37 Seven years later, the Second Home Rule Bill
met an identical fate in the House of Lords.38 Not until 1914 did
33. DESMOND HAMILL, PIG IN THE MIDDLE: THE ARMY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1969-1984,
at 32 (1985) (“The Times quoted a Belfast citizen saying: ‘Anyone who isn’t confused here
doesn’t really understand what is going on.’”).
34. See J.C. BECKETT, THE MAKING OF MODERN IRELAND 1603-1923, at 21 (1966) (ad-
dressing England’s “colonization” efforts in Ireland). 
35. See MALACHY MCCOURT, HISTORY OF IRELAND 102-12 (2004) (discussing the Crown’s
“plantation policies”). 
36. Id. at 197-200 (highlighting Charles Parnell’s push for home rule legislation).
37. See ALVIN JACKSON, HOME RULE: AN IRISH HISTORY 1800-2000, at 63 (2003) (dis-
cussing fate of the Home Rule bills).
38. Id. at 84.
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Dublin succeed in convincing Parliament to create a devolved, or
semi-decentralized, government for Irish representation.39 
Alas, Northern Unionists—that is, Protestants with fast cultural
and economic ties to Britain—firmly opposed any arrangement by
which they might be distanced from their motherland and rele-
gated to struggle under the perceived political caprice of Dublin.40
Marching under this banner of socioeconomic and ethnoreligious
consternation, Unionists gathered in droves to protest any attempt
at effectively implementing Home Rule.41 
Meanwhile, Irish Nationalists—largely Catholic southerners who
wanted full Irish autonomy and unification—struggled to divorce
their island from the English altogether. This particular strain of
revolutionary animosity rapidly devolved into armed conflict, with
Irish nationalists seizing, by force, several strategic locations in
Dublin and proclaiming Ireland unchained from its colonial shac-
kles.42 Termed the Easter Rising for its temporal coincidence with
the eponymous holiday, the insurrection barely lasted a full week
but resulted in a violent British crackdown that left approximately
400 dead.43 
In addition to quashing the nationalist rebellion through a sur-
prisingly agile and explosive show of force, the Crown proceeded to
try the presumed leaders of the uprising and handed down a stag-
gering ninety-seven capital sentences, although it ultimately car-
ried out only sixteen.44 Additionally, the Crown set about passing a
39. See BECKETT, supra note 34, at 434. This third Home Rule Act was never, in actuality,
implemented, as the outbreak of World War I forestalled it and the Unionist violence stymied
it. See JACKSON, supra note 37, at 143 (highlighting demise of the Home Rule movement in
the wake of World War I).
40. See BECKETT, supra note 34, at 439 (discussing the activation of the Ulster
Volunteers).
41. As a means to quantify their opposition, the Ulster Unionist Council drafted the
Ulster Covenant, swearing to defy the implementation of Home Rule; nearly 500,000 signa-
tures appear on the Covenant., The Ulster Covenant, PUB. RECS. OFF. N. IR., http://www.proni.
gov.uk/index/search_the_archives/ulster_covenant.htm [http://perma.cc/R549-NSMB] (last
visited Apr. 11, 2015).
42. See BECKETT, supra note 34, at 439 (discussing the events of Easter Week); see gener-
ally TIM P. COOGAN, 1916: THE EASTER RISING (2001) (offering a narrative of the six-day-long
conflict, its historical roots, and its ramifications). 
43. MICHAEL T. FOY & BRIAN BARTON, THE EASTER RISING 325 (2011).
44. The 1916 Rising: Personalities & Perspectives, NAT’L LIB. IR., http://www.nli.ie/1916/
1916_main.html [http://perma.cc/ UVS7-ENYK] (last visited Apr. 11, 2015).
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fourth and final Home Rule Act, which partitioned Ireland into a
six-county Northern region and a three-province Southern terri-
tory.45 Both of these reactionary steps—the violent crackdown on the
civil uprising and the forcible partition of the island—served little
end but to further entrench dissident factions and lay the
foundation for a century-long, blood-drenched conflict.
Yet, rather than immediately descend into unmitigated strife, the
conflict sat idle until the onset of the colloquially termed “Troubles”
in 1969.46 After several decades of rumination and brooding, nation-
alist riots broke out in County Londonderry, sparking the onset of
the pivotal three-day Battle of the Bogside, which pitted IRA pro-
testors against Loyalist paramilitary forces.47 In addition to
touching off the modern era of the Irish Troubles and providing a
microcosm of the strife that would seemingly plague the Emerald
Isle interminably, the Battle of the Bogside marked a seminal mo-
ment in the formation of the PIRA. This galvanizing process, as well
as the organizational structure and trajectory that it yielded, is
discussed immediately below.
2. Organizational Dynamics
Rising from the rubble of County Londonderry following the Bat-
tle of the Bogside was not one Irish Republican Army, but two. After
the fighting had ceased, the Provisional Army Council—acting as
the primary decision-making body for the IRA—split over a crucial
policy issue.48 The IRA’s leadership struggled mightily with whether
to continue nationalist representation through the Northern Irish
Stormont—and by extension through Parliament—or to abstain
from politicking altogether.49 Having witnessed the might of the
British response to republican crusading, many among the IRA’s
45. See BECKETT, supra note 34, at 442 (discussing the negotiations leading up to
partition). These borders and their attendant governance structure remained largely intact
until the Northern Ireland Act of 1998, which largely repealed all preceding home rule legis-
lation. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47 (U.K.).
46. See generally TIM P. COOGAN, THE TROUBLES: IRELAND’S ORDEAL 1966-1996 AND THE
SEARCH FOR PEACE (1996).
47. Id. at 74-81 (delivering a detailed account of the Battle of the Bogside).
48. See RICHARD ENGLISH, ARMED STRUGGLE: THE HISTORY OF THE IRA 114 (2003) (analyz-
ing the IRA split).
49. See id.
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leadership decided to accept a variant of Home Rule and politically
bound themselves to the Crown.50 Conversely, IRA hardliners
refused to bend and break in the imperial wind and raised their
arms all the higher.51 From this division, the traditional IRA
disbanded and much of its leadership drifted to the halls of
legitimate state power.52 The remaining former members coalesced
into two related groups—the PIRA and the Official Irish Republican
Army (OIRA).53 The former adopted a concerted strategy of guerilla
warfare with the desire to forcibly untether Ireland from England,
while the latter sought a similar goal, but while operating under the
color of a leftist, Marxist movement.54 
Forged from the extant leadership of the former IRA, the PIRA
quickly adopted a well-defined internal leadership structure in
order to carry out their war of attrition.55 To this end, the PIRA
coalesced around a top-down organization capped by the General
Army Convention (GAC).56 While this representative council met
only twice during the reign of the PIRA—once in 1970 and again in
1986—it served as the organization’s imperturbable ideological
rudder.57 Situated below the GAC, the IRA Executive Council and
the IRA Army Council handled the bulk of the PIRA’s decision
making.58 Here, the PIRA cloaked itself in a bizarrely formalistic
and almost corporate mantle, with the twelve-member Executive
Council electing the seven members of the Army Council.59
Strategies adopted by the Executive and Army Councils were
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 175.
54. See id. at 176; Matthew P. Chiarello, A Seat at the Negotiating Table: A Case Study
of Northern Irish Rebel Groups, 18 MONITOR J. INT’L STUD. 17, 21 (2013) (“[T]he OIRA saw
neither the success nor the longevity of the PIRA’s campaign. Rather, derisive terrorist tactics
worked to alienate the working class rather than unite them as a base of support for the
movement. As a result, the OIRA announced a ceasefire in 1972 in order to pursue their
popular front ideology in the bloodless forum of government.”).
55. See BRENDAN O’BRIEN, THE LONG WAR: THE IRA AND SINN FÉIN 158 (2d ed. 1999)
(describing the hierarchical structure of the PIRA).
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. Id. Additionally, the PIRA maintained a Chief of Staff through the Army Council,
along with an eight-department Cabinet. Id.
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dispatched to two Regional Commands—one operating in Northern
Ireland and the other in the South.60 At the regional level, directives
were circulated among local PIRA chapters, brigades, battalions,
and companies for ultimate implementation.61 
This rigid structural hierarchy was supplemented and reinforced
by standardized ideological tenets, codified in the PIRA’s Green
Book.62 This text—first printed in 1956 and later issued into wider
circulation in 1977—featured a veritable checklist of PIRA aims and
ambitions, from a recitation of a revisionist Anglo-Irish history, to
directions for maintaining a long war of attrition, to benchmarks for
establishing a post-Troubles government.63 
Having created an ironclad chain of command and having recruit-
ed zealous nationalists to its separatist cause, the PIRA set upon
a tragic campaign of terror with the aim of wearing Britain out
of Ireland. The PIRA’s attacks ranged from urban bombing sprees,
to mortar attacks on Downing Street and Heathrow Airport, to a
royal assassination.64 Although the precise medium of terrorism
varied widely during the PIRA’s half-century campaign, the dogged
mission—and the attendant devastating results—remained un-
changed.65 
Yet, these violent demonstrations came with a hefty price, as war-
weary civilians in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland
became increasingly disenchanted with the prospects of altering the
status quo. Recognizing the need for an alternative and less grue-
some course of action, PIRA leadership—largely through its political
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See generally IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY, IRA GREEN BOOK (1956), available at http://
perma.cc/D373-TE7R.
63. Id. at 8.
64. Kathryn Gregory, Provisional Irish Republican Army, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar.
16, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/separatist-terrorism/provisional-irish-republican-army-ira-aka-
pira-provos-glaigh-na-hireann-uk-separatists/p9240#p5 [http://perma.cc/C7E8-WS6G]. Most
notable among PIRA attacks stand the “bombing spree known as Bloody Friday, in which
downtown Belfast was rocked by twenty-two bombs in seventy-five minutes, leaving nine dead
and 130 injured.” Id. Additionally, in 1979, the PIRA claimed responsibility for assassinat-
ing Lord Mountbatten, Queen Elizabeth II’s uncle, after rigging his boat with explosives.
ENGLISH, supra note 48, at 220.
65. In a manner of unfairness, this Section nominally disregards the more pacifist strain
of PIRA activity, which focused on hunger strikes and political demonstrations. See, e.g.,
ENGLISH, supra note 48, at 194.
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arm, Sinn Féin—began conversing with the British government.66
These talks, initiated in the early 1990s, culminated in a self-
imposed ceasefire in 1997 and a tentative peace agreement in
1998.67 This accord was legitimized by submission to the Irish pub-
lic through the Good Friday Referendum and received staggering
approval—71 percent in the North and 95 percent in the South.68
Presumably buckling under the unwavering chorus of popular sent-
iment and British intransigence, the PIRA rapidly began a process
of arms decommissioning and traded its rifles for ballots.69
C. Al-Qaeda
Spawned at the close of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, al-
Qaeda—in its nearly thirty-year existence—has perpetrated some
of the most devastating terrorist attacks in modern history.70 From
its heinous plot against the World Trade Center complex,71 to its
bombing of public transport in the United Kingdom and Spain,72 to
its disruptive efforts against coalition troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan,73 al-Qaeda has acted with deadly calculus to advance
66. ENGLISH, supra note 48, at 290-91.
67. O’BRIEN, supra note 55, at 385 (discussing the hallmarks of the Good Friday Agree-
ment, noting in particular its emphasis on “constitutional balance [and] cross-community
decision-making”). 
68. See Colin Irwin, How Public Opinion Polls Were Used in Support of the Northern Irish
Peace Process, 1 GLOBAL REV. ETHNOPOLITICS 62, 62-64 (2001); The 1998 Referendums, ECON.
& SOC. RES. COUNCIL (Jan. 14, 2001), http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fref98.htm [http://perma.
cc/XHA7-XBK3]. These figures were bolstered by equally astounding turnout, as 81 percent
of Northern Ireland and 57 percent of the Republic of Ireland cast votes. The 1998 Referen-
dums, supra.
69. See David Trimble, The Belfast Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1145, 1166 (1998);
The Belfast Agreement (1998), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/136652/agreement.pdf [http://perma.cc/TYV4-AY3E].
70. See generally ABDEL B. ATWAN, THE SECRET HISTORY OF AL QAEDA (2006); ROHAN
GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA: GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERROR (2002).
71. See, e.g., LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11,
at 176 (2006).
72. Alan Cowell, Subway and Bus Blasts in London Kill at Least 37, N.Y. TIMES (July 8,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/08/international/europe/08bombings.html?pagewant
ed=all&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/Y9VV-HMGH]; Elaine Sciolino, Spain Struggles to Absorb Worst
Terrorist Attack in Its History, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/
03/11/international/europe/11CND-TRAI.html [http://perma.cc/VLM4-NYLR].
73. See generally ALI H. SOUFAN, THE BLACK BANNERS: THE INSIDE STORY OF 9/11 AND THE
WAR AGAINST AL-QAEDA (2011) (describing al-Qaeda’s involvement in the War on Terror).
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its own aims and ideology. Marching under the black banner of
Sunni extremism, al-Qaeda has effectuated a modern-day jihad that
has branded it one of the most deadly and potent terror
organizations in recent history.74 Illustrative of this ignominious
designation is the stark fact that al-Qaeda has executed a mere 1
percent of global terrorist attacks since 1998, but those attacks have
yielded over 20 percent of the fatalities attributed to terrorism
worldwide over the same period.75 
This Section looks to achieve the same ends by the same means
as the immediately preceding Section, which was concerned with the
PIRA. Thus, the first portion below situates al-Qaeda within its
unique historical and geopolitical circumstances, while the second
explores the institutional structure of the international terrorist
organization. Like its peer above, a brief discussion of al-Qaeda
warrants a proviso of its own: due to al-Qaeda’s clandestine nature
and its active status as a global terrorist organization, several ele-
ments of the group’s history and structure remain intense topics of
debate. Needless to say, when no clear answer is apparent, this Note
will shun bare assumptions and indicate the relevant scholarly
contentions.
1. Historical Background
Although the modern brand of al-Qaeda has global aspirations
and deep-seated ties to nations as disparate as Spain and Yemen,
Algeria and Indonesia, the terrorist organization originated in re-
sponse to a largely regional conflict: expelling the Soviet Union from
Afghanistan.76 As Soviet tanks rolled through provincial Afghan-
istan, the Afghan population scrambled for a means to expel the
74. GUNARATNA, supra note 70, at 12 (describing al-Qaeda as “an overwhelmingly Sunni
group, doctrinally and otherwise”). This ideological and religious motivation, however, may
hold a subservient station to the geopolitical pursuits of the organization. Id. (“Al Qaeda has
persistently argued that Islamist groups should shed their doctrinal differences and unite to
take on the real enemy, the West, and strike the US — ‘the head of the snake.’ ”). 
75. NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM & RESPONSES TO TERRORISM,
BACKGROUND REPORT: THE FATAL TERRORISM OF AL-QA’IDA 2 (2011), available at http://perma.
cc/8MCP-JW49.
76. See PETER TOMSEN, THE WARS OF AFGHANISTAN: MESSIANIC TERRORISM, TRIBAL
CONFLICTS, AND THE FAILURES OF GREAT POWERS 198-99 (2011) (describing al-Qaeda
leadership in Afghanistan during the 1980s).
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foreign invaders.77 Inspired by the theologically zealous sermons of
the Father of Global Jihad, Abdullah Azzam, radicals spilled into
Afghanistan from neighboring nations to fend off the resource-
hungry intruders.78 Spying an opportunity to strike at nonbelievers
near and far, a young Osama bin Laden began funneling vast sums
of money into the jihadi movement through a financial network
termed the “Golden Chain.”79 In addition to funding, bin Laden and
Azzam steered mujahideen manpower into training camps and, by
extension, into the anti-Soviet fray through an organization known
alternatively as the Services Office or Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK).80
By 1989, the war of attrition broke the seemingly ironclad Soviet
will, and President Mikhail Gorbachev ordered the withdrawal of
USSR forces from the Middle East.81 Bolstered by this success, bin
Laden set his sights on maintaining and expanding his regional
network, which had shed the MAK label and adopted the name al-
Qaeda—reflecting its newfound status as a “base” or “foundation”
of global operations.82 This decision caused tension between bin
Laden and Azzam, as the former pushed for expansion to conflicts
around the world while the latter solely wished to continue to fight
in the fields of Afghanistan in an effort to gain control of the rapidly
splintering nation.83 This internal policy debate concluded abruptly
when Azzam was assassinated in a coordinated car bombing in late
1989, and bin Laden’s al-Qaeda subsumed a majority of Azzam’s
now-rudderless adherents.84 
With this influx of motivated personnel, bin Laden set about
formulating a durable fighting force that could be deployed
throughout the world to wreak havoc on those who would suppress
77. See id. at 118.
78. See id. at 193-95 (introducing Azzam and his rhetoric to the conflict in Afghanistan). 
79. See WRIGHT, supra note 71, at 3 (discussing financial network crafted by bin Laden).
See generally JOHN ROTH ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., TER-
RORIST FINANCING STAFF MONOGRAPH 17-29, 94 (2002), available at http://perma.cc/TV2U-
RUJF.
80. See ATWAN, supra note 70, at 74 (connecting Azzam, bin Laden, and MAK); see also
WRIGHT, supra note 71, at 105 (noting that of all the mujahideen that participated in the war
against the Soviet Union, there were no more than 3000 bin Laden-sponsored foreign fighters
in Afghanistan at any one time).
81. See TOMSEN, supra note 76, at 340-41 (summarizing Soviet retreat from Afghanistan).
82. ATWAN, supra note 70, at 44.
83. See id. at 74-75.
84. See id.
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the rising Islamic revival.85 In order to zealously advance a carefully
crafted agenda of geopolitical disruption, al-Qaeda narrowed its
sights on two targets, one far and one near.86 The former, in broad
terms, connoted the United States and the Western values therein
fostered and exported.87 The latter—and arguably the more signif-
icant enemy in the eyes of al-Qaeda leadership—consisted of apos-
tate governments in the Middle East, those nations and leaders
perceived to have bowed to Western influence and abandoned strict
Sunni governance.88 Central to battling the capitulating near ene-
mies stood the assault on the Saudi government, primarily targeted
by al-Qaeda for allowing the United States to place forward bases
on the peninsula during the run-up to the First Gulf War.89 Unshak-
en by al-Qaeda’s rabblerousing and largely rhetorical carping, the
House of Saud exiled bin Laden with the hope of quashing his jihadi
movement.90 
Yet, apparently only emboldened by his homeland’s disavowal, bin
Laden took refuge in Sudan and began rapidly expanding the sphere
of al-Qaeda’s influence.91 It was from this remote North African post
that bin Laden dispatched al-Qaeda’s first forays into internation-
al terrorism, coordinating and funding attacks against American
Black Hawks in Somalia,92 the World Trade Center in 1993,93 and
85. See, e.g., Bill Roggio, The Seven Phases of The Base, LONG WAR J. (Aug. 15, 2005),
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2005/08/the_seven_phase.php [http://perma.cc/LSJ4-
L6RK] (outlining one formulation of al-Qaeda strategy as articulated by one of al-Qaeda’s top
leaders, Saif al-Adel). 
86. See Christopher Henzel, The Origins of al Qaeda’s Ideology: Implications for US Strat-
egy, 35 PARAMETERS 69, 75 (2005) (differentiating the near from the far enemy).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 71 (“[T]he experience of their movement drives them to view their opponents
within Sunni Islam—‘the near enemy’—as a more important target than non-Muslims—‘the
far enemy.’”).
89. See ROLAND JACQUARD, IN THE NAME OF OSAMA BIN LADEN: GLOBAL TERRORISM & THE
BIN LADEN BROTHERHOOD 25-27 (Samia Serageldin ed., George Heloch trans., 2002) (noting
bin Laden’s calls against the Saudi government). 
90. Id. at 25-26.
91. Id. at 27-29.
92. Bill Roggio, Shabaab Leader Recounts al Qaeda’s Role in Somalia in the 1990s, LONG
WAR J. (Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/12/shabaab_leader_
recou.php [http://perma.cc/B7FD-FRAK].
93. Richard A. Serrano, After 15 Years in Solitary, Convicted Terrorist Pleads for Contact
with Others, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/16/nation/la-na-
yousef-solitary-20130217 [http://perma.cc/5ZS5-659E]. 
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a U.S.-Saudi military training facility in 1995.94 Thrust into the
gruesome spotlight of international terror, al-Qaeda was forced from
Sudan and made to return to a crumbling Afghanistan to seek
refuge in the folds of the rising Taliban.95 
From this fundamentalist perch, bin Laden issued dual fat-
wa—“Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the
Land of the Two Holy Places”96 and “World Islamic Front’s
Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders”97—
hyperbolically condemning American involvement in the Middle
East and calling for believers to wage total war against the West.98
Uniting under this vitriolic banner, several prominent jihadi
groups—including Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamist
Jihad—merged into al-Qaeda.99 Swollen in size, funding, and
ideological zeal, al-Qaeda set upon orchestrating a new string of
devastating attacks. In late 1998, al-Qaeda detonated simultaneous
truck bombs at the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya,
killing hundreds and injuring thousands.100 Two years later, al-
Qaeda staged an aquatic suicide attack on the USS Cole off the
coast of Yemen, leaving seventeen American troops dead.101 Shortly
thereafter, al-Qaeda launched its most devastating and infamous
attack against the United States in September 2001, slaying nearly
94. Robert Windrem, Al-Qaida Timeline: Plots and Attacks, NBC NEWS, http://www.
nbcnews.com/id/4677978/#.UobxaZTwJ18 [http://perma.cc/AVE7-FBEK] (last visited Mar. 30,
2015).
95. See JACQUARD, supra note 89, at 37-39 (discussing bin Laden’s time “[a]mong the
Taliban”).
96. World Islamic Front, Bin Laden’s Fatwa, PBS (Aug. 23, 1996), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/updates/military/july-dec96-fatwa_1996/ [http://perma.cc/D37J-QNEF].
97. World Islamic Front, Al Qaeda’s Second Fatwa, PBS (Feb. 23, 1998), http://www.pbs.
org/newshour/updates/military/jan-june98/fatwa_1998/ [http://perma.cc/5KT4-M4F4].
98. Among the paragraphs of vitriol stands a call to action:
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an
individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is
possible to do it, in order to liberate ... [Mecca] from their grip and in order for
their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to
threaten any Muslim.
Id.
99. See WRIGHT, supra note 71, at 260. Among the signatories to this second fatwa were
several prominent terror-group leaders including bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, Abu-Yasir Rafa’l
Ahamad Taha, and Fazlul Rahman. Id.
100. ATWAN, supra note 70, at 226.
101. Id. at 80.
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3000 American civilians and pitching the world’s economies into
disarray.102
Yet this calculated strike against al-Qaeda’s far enemy came with
substantial consequences, as the United States rapidly mobilized
against its assailants, with Congress passing the Authorization for
Use of Military Force (AUMF) merely three days after the attack.103
This broad mandate precipitated nearly immediate war in
Afghanistan, along with anti-terror operations in the Philippines,
Somalia, Mali, Pakistan, and Yemen.104 Most estimates from within
the intelligence community suggest that the War on Terror has
significantly impacted al-Qaeda’s ability to plan and perpetrate
attacks.105 Yet, even in the wake of a global counterterrorism effort,
al-Qaeda has managed to coordinate and influence attacks in Bali,
Mombasa, Riyadh, Jakarta, Madrid, and London, among others.106
In addition, al-Qaeda continues to wage war against the United
States both domestically—claiming responsibility for training the
Underwear Bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab107—and abroad,
in a series of strikes in Iraq and Afghanistan. This war of attrition
continues, more or less unabated, even in light of the impressive
measures taken by the United States and coalition partners to put
an end to the violence perpetrated by al-Qaeda.108 These
counterterrorism efforts materialized in full force in May 2011, as
elite American forces were dispatched to neutralize bin Laden after
he was located in Pakistan.109 In the wake of bin Laden’s death, al-
Qaeda continues to operate in pursuit of its destabilizing objectives,
driven by a powerful network of terrorist operatives. Precisely this
organizational structure will be discussed in the Section to follow.
102. See generally 9/11 COMMISSION, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004), available at
http://perma.cc/MD52-NYWZ (investigating the perpetration of the September 11 attacks).
103. Authorization of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
104. See RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR 275
(2004); PAUL RUSCHMANN, THE WAR ON TERROR 12, 14-15 (Alan Marzilli ed., 2d ed. 2008).
105. Rachel Briggs, The Changing Face of Al Qaeda, INST. STRATEGIC DIALOGUE 1, 1-2 (2012),
http://www.strategicdialogue.org/The%20Changing%20Face%20of%20Al%20Qaeda.pdf
[http://perma.cc/FCM5-NQPJ]. 
106. See Windrem, supra note 94 and accompanying text.
107. Charlie Savage, Christmas Day Bomb Plot Detailed in Court Filings, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/11/us/underwear-bomb-plot-detailed-in-court-
filings.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/LH2Y-4CS3].
108. See, e.g., RUSCHMANN, supra note 104, at 59.
109. See MARK BOWDEN, THE FINISH: THE KILLING OF OSAMA BIN LADEN 210-13 (2012).
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2. Organizational Dynamics
From its inception to its decapitation, al-Qaeda has defied
scholarly attempts to precisely identify its organizational struc-
ture.110 As may have been apparent from the above-recited history
of al-Qaeda, the group’s structure is markedly difficult to extricate
from its upper-echelon leadership, and in many ways the story of
the organization is the biography of its leader. This difficulty and
peculiarity does not necessarily indicate that there are no truths to
behold regarding the composition of the transnational terrorist
group. Rather, it merely suggests that a degree of caution when dis-
cussing the certitude of conclusions may be warranted. In light of
that observation, what follows is a cursory examination of the
decision-making structure of al-Qaeda, which flows chronologically
for conceptual ease.
The narrative surrounding the early phases of al-Qaeda suggests
that the organization was originally little more than a funnel by
which funds and manpower were siphoned into the Afghan-Soviet
conflict.111 Decision-making functions, at the time, were localized in
the hands of bin Laden and Azzam.112 Shortly after the fledgling al-
Qaeda’s perceived success against the Soviet Union, bin Laden
began a process of formalizing his union of fundamentalist
operatives. In late 1988, bin Laden and his advisors drafted an oath
of loyalty to al-Qaeda and designed concrete plans for training and
exploiting members in a global struggle.113 
110. Katherine Zimmerman, The al Qaeda Network: A New Framework for Defining
the Enemy, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. 1, 5 (2013), http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/
pdf_upload/analysis/Zimmerman_the_al_Qaeda_Network_September_2013.pdf
[http://perma.cc/73E5-GWYF] (“The al-Qaeda network has changed over the years, and so
have the various frameworks used to explain it. The corpus of research on al Qaeda is exten-
sive and portrays varying ideas of how the network itself functions, ranging from a core group
of senior leaders directing a global network to an amorphous group of individuals driving
toward a shared objective. The adaptive nature of the network and the complexity of the ways
in which members and groups interact within the network exacerbate the challenge of
understanding the organization.”).
111. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
112. See WRIGHT, supra note 71, at 132 (quoting bin Laden: “I am only one person. We have
started neither an organization nor an Islamic group”).
113. In a bizarrely corporate fashion, minute entries exist for the first documented al-
Qaeda meeting on August 8, 1988, wherein the “secretary listed the requirements of those
who sought to join this new organization” and dictated an oath of membership. Id. at 133.
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As bin Laden shuttled between Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Af-
ghanistan after helping to thwart the Soviet invasion, he allegedly
made contacts with other like-minded men and organizations.114
These associates gradually coalesced around the message espoused
by bin Laden in his first fatwa deriding the United States, and by
the time al-Qaeda issued its second fatwa in 1998, it did so with the
full-throated endorsement of fellow Islamic extremists under the
banner of the World Islamic Front.115 The 9/11 Commission Report
describes the decision-making structure of al-Qaeda in the period
leading up to the attacks on the United States homeland as follows: 
The inner core of al Qaeda continued to be a hierarchical top-
down group with defined positions, tasks, and salaries. Most but
not all in this core swore fealty (or bayat) to Bin Ladin. Other
operatives were committed to Bin Ladin or to his goals and
would take assignments for him, but they did not swear bayat
and maintained, or tried to maintain, some autonomy. A looser
circle of adherents might give money to al Qaeda or train in its
camps but remained essentially independent.116
Following the tightly orchestrated attacks of 9/11 and the subse-
quent American mobilization against al-Qaeda, the authoritative
clarity of the organization’s structure begins to fade. One strand,
advanced by Katherine Zimmerman, suggests that al-Qaeda pres-
ently exists as a core group operating largely from Pakistan with
affiliates and associates radiating out along a spectrum of
allegiance.117 By contrast, others suggest that al-Qaeda has devolved
in leadership but evolved in complexity following the deaths of bin
114. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
116. 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 102, at 67. But see Zimmerman, supra note 110, at 9-10
(marginalizing al-Qaeda’s perceived monolithic structure).
117. See Zimmerman, supra note 110, at 14-15. In Zimmerman’s model, affiliates are those
“[g]roups that have publicly pledged allegiance to the al Qaeda emir and have in turn received
public recognition as part of al Qaeda by the al Qaeda emir.” Id. at 15. Associates, by contrast,
are “[g]roups that exhibit a sufficient number of characteristics common within the al Qaeda
network such as shared resources, overlapping fighter or leadership networks, a common
signature, and ideological alignment with al Qaeda,” but have not been publically endorsed
by the central al-Qaeda entity. Id. 
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Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki.118 This view is predicated primarily on
the erratic nature of recent al-Qaeda efforts as compared against
the elaborate plots perpetrated in the 2000s.119 Taken to its extreme,
this structural argument suggests a trend toward “ ‘lone wolf ’ terror-
is[m],” in which al-Qaeda “empower[s] and motivate[s] individuals
to commit violence outside of any chain of command.”120 
In light of these wholly divergent modes of explaining the present
formulation of al-Qaeda, one truth stands paramount: “[W]e cannot
simplify the problem or discount aspects of the network without
creating a dangerous misunderstanding that will shape a faulty
strategy for combating it.”121 Thus, resolving the tension between
and among these conflicting theoretical models is imperative to
shaping a coherent negotiating strategy, as will become apparent in
the remainder of this Note.
III. HOW THE UNITED KINGDOM RESOLVED THE PIRA PROBLEM
From pipe bombings to hunger strikes, the disruptive agenda of
the PIRA served to rankle the British homeland for decades.122 Un-
daunted by the power of Parliament, the PIRA operated with
clandestine impunity to sever the Emerald Isle from the
Commonwealth.123 Unrelenting in the face of terrorism, the English
refused large-scale concessions for the duration of the Troubles and
matched aggression with oppression.124 What follows considers how
this smoldering deadlock reached peaceable resolution after
seemingly interminable strife. 
In brief, the following case study will posit three related factors
that drew the United Kingdom and the PIRA to the negotiating
table and sent them away with a brokered peace agreement in hand.
First, Section A will examine the clout of the United Kingdom and
how the might of the established state was leveraged to tip the
118. See Briggs, supra note 105, at 1-2 (advancing the theory of al-Qaeda’s diffuse network
structure).
119. Id. (“[A]ttacks are becoming less complex, because the organizational structure has
become fragmented following the incarceration or assassination of key terrorist personnel.”).
120. Id. 
121. Zimmerman, supra note 110, at 5.
122. See supra Part II.B.1.
123. See supra Part II.B.1.
124. See supra Part II.B.1.
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battlefield away from the geopolitically untethered PIRA. Second,
Section B will assess how the organizational factors discussed above
in Part II impacted both the formation of a negotiated agreement
and the efficacy of its enforcement. Finally, Section C will suggest
that limited and functional negotiations neutralized harmful rhet-
oric and minimized fundamentalist collateral. 
Exposition of the relevant facts and factors that allowed for
an operative cessation of violence in the Anglo-Irish conflict is not
presented in a vacuum. Rather, this Note looks to present a func-
tional and transferrable model for endorsing a policy that leverages
the power of alternative dispute resolution in international affairs.
In short, the United States should look to these three factors in con-
structing a strategy for dealing effectively with terrorist groups and,
in so doing, should embrace a policy of open negotiations with
dissidents to fulfill American objectives.
A. Tipping the Battlefield: Negotiations and State Leverage
Reports of carnage in the streets of Belfast and Dublin did not
prompt the Crown to sit idle on its throne. Rather, Parliament dis-
patched thousands of troops to defend Loyalist enclaves and to stem
the rising tide of sectarian terror under Operation Banner.125 British
forces, alongside royal police regiments, enforced stringent curfews
in Irish cities and exacted harsh justice on actual and suspected
guerrillas.126 In addition to placing proverbial boots on the ground,
Parliament leveled domestic and international condemnation at the
PIRA and related nationalist forces.127 Thus, despite waging a de
facto, albeit limited, ground war, the English insisted on a political
resolution sufficient to end the violence. In hindsight, the Crown’s
ability to apply forcible leverage to counteract a deteriorating situ-
ation and to appear resolute in the face of a long war of attrition
proved critical to putting an end to the Troubles. Evaluating the
125. See supra Part II.B. At the conflict’s zenith, the British Army had approximately
35,000 troops deployed in Northern Ireland. Max Hastings, Army Cuts: Farewell to Our
Warrior Nation, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/
9667102/Army-cuts-Farewell-to-our-warrior-nation.html [http://perma.cc/V9D9-QHPS]; see
also NICK VAN DER BIJL, OPERATION BANNER: THE BRITISH ARMY IN NORTHERN IRELAND: 1969
TO 2007, at 27-28 (2009) (providing background on the early phases of Operation Banner).
126. See BIJL, supra note 125, at 34-35 (detailing the martial law in effect in Irish cities).
127. See COOGAN, supra note 46, at 134 (highlighting public reaction to PIRA violence).
2015] ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2303
capacity to employ the assets of the state to tip the battlefield away
from dissident counterparties will be the focus of the material in
this Section.
The ostensible layman’s handbook to conducting alternative
dispute resolution, Getting to Yes, devotes an entire chapter to the
perennial problem with negotiations: what steps to take when the
other side is “more powerful.”128 For Fisher and Ury, the answer lies
in the weaker party’s ability to protect its own interests and to
marshal its limited assets to its ultimate benefit.129 Yet, this vague
strategy cannot “guarantee success if all the leverage lies on the
other side.”130 Terrorist groups, unsatisfied with this result, have
repeatedly advanced an alternative answer in their dealings with
liberal democracies: asymmetrical warfare.131 The Long War waged
by the PIRA against the British typified this brutal strategy. Enlist-
ing a small cadre of zealous nationalists, the PIRA bombed and shot
their way into the domestic and international public square.132 From
that open vantage, the PIRA held hostage the Emerald Isle as
ransom against the severance of ties with the United Kingdom.133 In
line with prototypical guerilla campaigns, the PIRA sought a
“specific secular and strategic goal: to compel [a] liberal democrac[y]
to withdraw military forces from territory that the [PIRA] terrorists
consider to be their homeland.”134 In the case of the Troubles, the
PIRA held its proverbial gun to the head of the Irish people for
decades without a blink from the English.
Instead of offering concessions—rightly or wrongly—the Crown
entrenched itself in firm, coherent policy objectives that focused
on unity within the Commonwealth, and decried guerilla violence.135
In the geopolitical echo chamber, the English offered an American
refrain: we will not negotiate with terrorists. And yet, objective-
128. FISHER & URY, supra note 22, at 99-108.
129. Id. at 99.
130. Id. 
131. See supra notes 31-32, 55-65 and accompanying text. But see Antulio J. Echevarria
II, Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths, STRATEGIC STUD. INST. 1, 6 (2005), http://www.
strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub632.pdf [http://perma.cc/E5R3-U9ZN] (count-
ering principles of fourth-generation guerilla warfare).
132. See supra Part II.B.2.
133. Id. 
134. Robert Pape, Dying to Kill Us, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/09/22/opinion/dying-to-kill-us.html [http://perma.cc/YG2V-CUCY].
135. See supra Part II.B.2.
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driven, tacit bargaining belied the hollow Anglo-American
prohibition. To that end, the English sent troops to combat rebels,
dispatched politicians to entreat with Sinn Féin, and enlisted
international partners to denounce the sectarian violence.136 Even
Prime Minister Thatcher directly, albeit secretly, responded to PIRA
demands during the 1981 hunger strikes.137 
These steps demonstrate no weakness or feeble acquiescence; to
the contrary, they speak to rational restraint and calculated lev-
erage. In tacitly bargaining with the PIRA, the English
accomplished two concomitant goals. First, they clearly signaled
that Parliament remained open to reaching a peace agreement on
terms favorable to the Crown. Second, the British demonstrated
that they would not capitulate in a war of attrition and would draw
upon the virtually unlimited resources of the state to combat
terrorism far into the future. Thus, when the Troubles grew stale
and the populations of the United Kingdom and Ireland complained
loudly of war-weariness, the English were able to credibly draw a
seat for the PIRA at the negotiating table. In extending an iron
hand in a velvet glove to the PIRA, the English ensured that the
Crown would preserve its interests: violence would end, arms would
be decommissioned, and the public would be placated. Emphatically,
these aims were achieved through negotiations and would not have
been realized or sustained through continued conflict. 
B. Organizational Criteria
The origins of the PIRA dictated their top-down organizational
structure. Formed from an established coalition of freedom fighters
and nationalists, the PIRA established a clear chain of command, a
hierarchy that would dominate their planning and tactics for the
duration of their active existence.138 Dispatches from the upper eche-
lons of the PIRA organization translated into highly coordinated
and devastating attacks on soldiers and civilians alike.139 Not only
did the command and control structure facilitate violence, but it also
allowed for the formulation and dispersal of a unified message. By
136. See Part II.B.2.
137. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
138. See supra Part II.B.2.
139. See supra Part II.B.2.
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maintaining tight organizational control, PIRA leaders remained
free to formulate a cogent agenda and take concerted steps to
actualize their geopolitical aims.140 It was precisely this level of
control over message and means that allowed the United Kingdom
to reach and enforce a negotiated settlement with the PIRA.141 Thus,
what follows is a brief examination of the PIRA’s structural ability
to press for concessions at the negotiating table and England’s
position in exploiting the monolithic terrorist group’s organization.
After decades of violence, the Troubles began to wear popular
opinion to the bone.142 What began as a fervent nationalist
movement on the fringes of Irish society gradually unraveled to a
state of cautious stalemate.143 At the outset of the conflict, bombings
would garner support and rattle opposition forces.144 Entering the
1980s, the PIRA leadership instigated a series of public
demonstrations—including the infamous hunger strikes of 1981—to
further bolster public opinion of the nationalist movement and to
throw electoral stones at the English.145 Seeing success at the polls
and in the streets from this diversified strategy, the PIRA
executives began pushing resources into their political arm, Sinn
Féin.146 This strategy was captured colorfully by PIRA elite, Danny
Morrison, at an annual Sinn Féin meeting: “with a ballot paper in
this hand, and an Armalite [machine gun] in this hand, we take
power in Ireland.”147
Yet, as the war trudged towards the 1990s, the attacks and rallies
had lost their intended impact, and popular opinion of the PIRA
140. See supra Part II.B.2.
141. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
142. See JACK HOLLAND, HOPE AGAINST HISTORY: THE COURSE OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN
IRELAND 3-4 (1999) (discussing the trajectory of the Troubles).
143. See id. at 3-5.
144. See id.
145. See generally BERESFORD, supra note 3, at 27 (recounting the demonstrations in
Belfast’s Long Kesh prison that left ten inmates starved to death). These protests were highly
effective in garnering popular support, as represented by the tens of thousands of mourners
and protestors who attended Bobby Sands’s funeral after he succumbed to starvation. See id.
at 103.
146. Sinn Féin garnered 10 percent of the Northern Irish vote in 1982. 1982: Sinn Féin
Triumph in Election, BBC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/
stories/october/21/newsid_2489000/2489349.stm [http://perma.cc/K2J9-NSTM].
147. ENGLISH, supra note 48, at 225.
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flagged dramatically.148 Sensing an opportunity to capitalize on a
reduction in nationalist fervor, the United Kingdom opened dialogue
with Sinn Féin and PIRA leadership.149 These relatively secret talks,
although at times inflammatory and seemingly counterproductive,
yielded a temporary ceasefire in 1994.150 This agreement—forged
between Sinn Féin and the United Kingdom—called for a cessation
of violence in exchange for further talks between the parties.151
Having induced the PIRA to sit at the negotiating table, the
British attempted to leverage their assets and demanded that the
PIRA disarm entirely before discussing further settlement.152 This
maneuver overplayed the Crown’s hand and drove the PIRA to raise
arms, once again, against England.153 Two years elapsed and multi-
ple bombs detonated before the ceasefire was reinstated in 1997.154
This cessation proved largely permanent, as the UK and PIRA ad-
vanced towards a workable compromise codified in the Good Friday
Agreement.155 
This Note contends that the Good Friday Agreement—or any
agreement for that matter—would have been virtually impossible
had the PIRA been a diffuse collection of renegade zealots. The
tightly controlled terrorist organization allowed for the leadership
to take a long view of the political landscape and to develop optimal
strategies for realizing secular, political goals. As guerilla warfare
began producing diminishing returns and as the door to Parliament
creaked open, the PIRA leadership recognized a viable alternative
and exploited it for mutual gain. The above-discussed process of
negotiating over and signing the Good Friday Agreement clearly
demonstrates the indispensable role organizational dynamics plays
in the process of negotiating with terrorists in two crucial ways.
First, the PIRA’s monolithic and objective-oriented leadership al-
lowed for the UK to engage with a single entity on substantive
issues. Negotiations would have been impossible had the PIRA been
structurally and ideologically diffuse. Second, the PIRA’s rigid lines
148. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
150. See O’BRIEN, supra note 55, at 26.
151. See id. at 346-47.
152. See id. at 347-48.
153. See id. at 354.
154. See id. at 375.
155. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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of command and control allowed for the creation of a credible, en-
forceable resolution. Bargaining to end the conflict required a select
few of the PIRA’s upper leadership to bind the group’s nearly 10,000
constituent members.156 This feat of negotiated conflict resolution
was made possible by the PIRA’s organizational structure and the
UK’s incisive ability to mold a landmark agreement around the
institutional features of the terrorist group.
C. Limiting Fundamentalist Collateral
At base, the aims of most terrorist groups are secular and politi-
cal.157 Inflaming ideological passions and stoking religious zeal, it
seems, are largely means to an end.158 Pointing to the oppression of
the perceived colonizer or to the atrocities of the unseen far enemy
provides fodder for both the guerilla foot soldiers and the civilian
population at large.159 Such inflammatory rhetoric provides indis-
pensable sustenance to a long-term, asymmetrical campaign of ter-
ror. As such, it is in the interest of the targeted state to minimize
such vitriol and, in so doing, rob the terrorist of a mighty motiva-
tional tool. This Note posits that offering credible settlements
through negotiations and alternative means of dispute resolution
may play a crucial role in so disarming dissident groups.
In this department, the United Kingdom struggled throughout
the Troubles. Parliament’s initial response to the onset of the sect-
arian violence was to funnel troops and supplies into many Irish
cities.160 Ostensibly imposing martial law on the Emerald Isle, the
British imposed rigid curfews and dealt roughly with those suspect-
ed of dissident activities.161 Yet, these oppressive measures
engendered further resentment of the colonial-minded English
156. See ED MOLONEY, A SECRET HISTORY OF THE IRA, at xviii (Penguin Books 2d ed. 2007).
157. See Pape, supra note 25, at 343, 345-48 (distilling the aims of suicide terrorism). 
158. See id. at 347 (“The more suicide terrorists justify their actions on the basis of
religious or ideological motives that match the beliefs of a broader national community, the
more the status of the terrorist martyrs is elevated, and the more plausible it becomes that
others will follow in their footsteps.”).
159. See id. at 348.
160. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
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among the native Irish population.162 Armed intervention through
a de facto ground war on Irish nationalism proved largely
counterproductive to reaching the English aim of staving off the
bloodshed.163
Ultimately, however, the English vented the steam of nationalist
fervor by opening the valve of negotiated compromise.164 Seeing a
growing stalemate on the horizon, the Crown dispatched delegations
to gain an impression of the PIRA’s agenda.165 As these talks be-
came public in the early 1990s, the typically acerbic rhetoric seemed
to be overshadowed by a moderate cloud. With the prospect of real-
izing considerable gains in their separatist agenda through
substantive negotiations with the Crown, PIRA leadership actively
minimized its more radical elements.166 Thus, when the ink dried on
the ceasefire, only a handful of dissidents clung to their guns; the
PIRA and the English met mutual objectives and created little
additional friction in the process.167 In sum, by signaling to the PIRA
that a settlement was possible—and in many ways necessary to end
the conflict—the United Kingdom provided a platform for reaching
an enforceable agreement without exacerbating long-standing prob-
lems or instigating new ideological grievances. This ability to
neutralize ideological fervor and limit fundamentalist collateral
ensures that the agreements reached in 1998 will extend
undisturbed well into the future.
162. In assessing the imposition of curfews, for instance, one Sinn Féin leader remarked:
“thousands of people ... who had never had any time for physical force now accepted it as a
practical necessity.” MALCOLM GLADWELL, DAVID & GOLIATH 222 (2013).
163. See supra Part II.B.1.
164. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
165. See ENGLISH, supra note 48, at 158 (focusing on political contact points between the
PIRA and the UK).
166. Rather than deliver rants against colonial oppression, several key PIRA elite began
speaking in the diction of compromise. O’BRIEN, supra note 55, at 267 (“In a carefully crafted
speech, McGuinness did not call for a British withdrawal and he indicated that the
Republican Movement was ready for compromise.”).
167. Two minority nationalist groups repudiated the agreement and continued armed
resistance: the Continuity Irish Republican Army and the Real Irish Republican Army. See
generally JOHN MOONEY & MICHAEL O’TOOLE, BLACK OPERATIONS: THE SECRET WAR AGAINST
THE REAL IRA (2003). These groups’ impact on the conflict has been marginal but lurks on the
periphery of the present peace. See Henry McDonald, Republican Dissidents Join Forces to
Form a New IRA, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jul/26/ira-
northern-ireland-dissident-republican-groups [http://perma.cc/Y8AZ-XG9A].
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IV. NEGOTIATING WITH AL-QAEDA
Targeting the far enemy of the United States for several decades,
al-Qaeda has proven a durable and audacious enemy. Claiming a
disproportionate share of terrorist-related fatalities and charging
their political aims with harsh ideology, the terrorist organization
foiled many American attempts to quash its global network.168 Os-
tensibly, America waged two wars with the explicit aim of eradi-
cating al-Qaeda and its sponsors, and provided support for cam-
paigns against terrorism in dozens of countries across the world.169
At no time has the American government openly offered
negotiations, and it never conceded any strategic or political ground
in the pursuit of quelling terrorist attacks.170 This Note strenuously
argues that such a strategy should be abandoned and must be
replaced by a policy regime that recognizes the efficacy of
alternative means of dispute resolution. Such a policy need
not—and emphatically should not—appease terrorists. Rather, the
proposed policy places a viable option on the table for the United
States to leverage its considerable assets in the pursuit of realizing
tangible goals in the war against terror. 
To that end, this Section will focus on applying the lessons glean-
ed from the Anglo-Irish experience, as detailed in Part III.
Naturally, then, this Section will parallel the tripartite framework
there articulated: (1) applying state leverage to tip the battlefield in
America’s favor; (2) understanding the organizational framework of
the enemy so as to garner acceptable concessions; and (3) limiting
the creation of additional fundamentalist grievances. Crafting
American policy in light of these three criteria will have the
ultimate effect of reaching a settlement with foreign dissidents that
objectively advances the interests of the United States. Clinging to
antiquated foreign policy notions that eschew international engage-
ment, even in the face of irredeemable violence, should no longer be
the preferred stance of the United States. Rather, American
168. See supra Part II.C.
169. See generally CLARKE, supra note 104 (outlining strategies in the war on terror).
170. See id.
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leadership should actualize its policy interest by seeking an
alternative means: negotiating with terrorists. 
A. Tipping the Battlefield: Negotiations and State Leverage
Discussing American military strength necessarily involves
hyperbole.171 In brief, the American military machine accounts
for nearly half of all global expenditures on fighting forces and
national defense.172 Further, the United States boasts a robust
foreign policy apparatus and seeks engagement with nearly every
nation on earth.173 These two assets—the American soldier and the
American statesman—function in tandem to ensure unbalanced ne-
gotiations that advance the interests of the United States abroad.
From friendly relations with allies to tense negotiations with
regimes that aid and abet campaigns of terrorism, the United States
hardly hesitates to employ all options at its disposal to further its
agenda. The United States need not abandon these powerful re-
sources the instant the counterparty materializes as a nonstate
actor; the war on terror may be condoned or condemned, but it must,
at the very least, be calculated.
Reflecting briefly on the English experience in Ireland, this Note
previously suggested that the British response was that of a govern-
ment speaking in terms of prohibiting negotiations with the dissi-
dents, but acting as though it was deaf to its own mandate.174 In so
doing, Parliament remained resolute in the eyes of the public, im-
movable in the view of the nationalist movement, and potentially
reasonable in the estimate of the PIRA’s leadership. In America’s
struggle with al-Qaeda, this trifecta provides a reasonable template
for advancing American interests and for curtailing the violence of
171. Comparing defense expenditures in the United States against similar budgets globally
indicates that America outspends its closest competitor, China, six-to-one. Lacey Heeley, U.S.
Defense Spending vs. Global Defense Spending, CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL & NON-
PROLIFERATION (Apr. 24, 2013), http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/securityspending/articles/
2012_topline_global_defense_spending/ [http://perma.cc/P4FA-2URK]. In fact, America’s de-
fense budget in 2012 touts a sum double that of defense budgets in all Asian nations combined
over the same period. Id. 
172. See id.
173. See U.S. Bilateral Relations Fact Sheets, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/ei/bgn [http://perma.cc/VUL5-6AR4] (last visited Apr. 11, 2015).
174. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
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jihadi terrorism. Moreover, the United States occupies a unique
hegemonic place in the world order such that affecting such a balan-
ced stance in the War on Terror requires very little maneuvering
and minimal reallocation of resources.175 
Rather than collapse in the face of senseless violence at the close
of 2001, American leadership staunchly denounced the tactics of
terrorism and resolutely announced that the nation would not be
coerced by foreign fundamentalists. To that end, Congress passed
the AUMF and broadly encouraged the Executive Branch to rain
fire—militarily, economically, and politically—on al-Qaeda, its
associates, and its sponsors.176 This response engendered a
multitude of economic sanctions, propelled two Middle Eastern
wars, and crowded foreign skies with drones.177 Leveraging
American forces in the pursuit of defeating al-Qaeda is not, in the
strictest sense, a negotiation. Massive military retaliation is,
however, powerful leverage at the bargaining table. In this
department, the sheer size and scope of the United States’ response
to al-Qaeda dwarfs the British reaction to the PIRA.178 
Yet, the United States does not treat its military mobilization
against al-Qaeda as one of leverage. Rather, American policy largely
calls for the defeat of al-Qaeda through military means and draws
upon the tactics of counterinsurgency warfare.179 This policy is only
part of the equation necessary to stem the violence wrought by al-
Qaeda, if the English experience in Ireland is to be any guide.
Critically, the United Kingdom sent more than troops—it sent a
powerful message through official and unofficial channels, one that
offered open dialogue in exchange for a cessation of violence against
the state and its civilians.180 Notice, this stance did not offer bald
concessions or appeasement of terrorist aims. Rather, calling the
175. See Christopher Layne & Benjamin Schwarz, American Hegemony—Without an En-
emy, 92 FOREIGN POL’Y 5, 5-7 (1993).
176. See Authorization of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §§ 1-2, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
177. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2048-50 (2005); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on
the Constitution: Executive Power and the War on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 3 (2006).
178. See supra Part III.
179. This policy is encapsulated in an Address to the Nation delivered by President George
W. Bush nine days after the events of 9/11. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint
Session of Congress and the Nation (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://perma.cc/9XBL-3ZCQ.
180. See supra Part III.A.
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dissidents into conversation leverages the assets of the state against
the relative weakness of its counterparty. Beginning a firm and un-
wavering dialogue with al-Qaeda and like-minded terrorist organi-
zations may advance American interests further than warfare alone.
Negotiation, in tandem with America’s devastating economic and
military power, might prove a compelling option in concluding the
war on terror on terms favorable to the United States.
B. Organizational Criteria
Effectively combating global terrorism cannot be an easy task for
any nation. The difficulties inherent in conducting a
counterinsurgency or counterterrorism campaign are innumerable
and are compounded when defining the enemy, itself, proves
challenging. As noted in Part II, civilian analysts in the United
States still grapple with the size, scope, and composition of al-Qaeda
as an organization.181 Theories of structure range from a global
monolith directed by a handful of elite jihadi, to an amorphous,
dissociated network of like-minded cells.182 It is in this respect that
the United States’s relationship with al-Qaeda substantially departs
from the largely analogous Anglo-Irish conflict; the PIRA, by nearly
all measures and metrics, exhibited a clearly defined top-down
structure and the English used this organizational fact to facilitate
negotiations and enforce practical solutions.183 By stark contrast, the
United States is forced to combat a terrorist group armed with
little in the way of information regarding the organization’s
institutional components.184 In light of this limited intelligence, two
primary alternatives emerge and will be dealt with, in turn, below:
(1) al-Qaeda as monolithic and (2) al-Qaeda as cellular.
In the first case, this Note treats al-Qaeda as exhibiting a com-
mand and control regime very similar to that adopted by the PIRA.
Under that framework, an elite group of jihadi strategists and
financiers guide the operations of the global terrorist operation and
181. See supra Part II.C.2.
182. See supra Part II.C.2.
183. See supra Part III.
184. To a certain degree, we may operate under the common assumption that the intelli-
gence community holds a greater degree of information regarding the organization than does
the average citizen.
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coordinate attacks directly with subordinates and surrogates.185 This
parallel with the PIRA presents the self-same solution: the United
States may negotiate with a select few in al-Qaeda’s upper echelon.
Those who hold sway over their underlings prove ideal coun-
terparties in reaching effective compromises, as was shown to be
true after the decommissioning of arms following the
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement.186 Even in the event
that the command and control lines are less rigid than those
exhibited by the PIRA, al-Qaeda’s core membership is likely a
fraction of the PIRA’s membership.187 Thus, negotiating concessions
and implementing a resolution might radiate out from al-Qaeda’s
leadership and affect all subordinate and associated terrorists. 
In the alternative case, al-Qaeda may evidence a dissociated and
cellular structure, in which constituent groups share ideology and
financing but lack interconnected leadership.188 Certainly, this sce-
nario provides the more challenging case for American engagement.
Although American leadership may have difficulty identifying al-
Qaeda leadership and, by extension, may face an uphill battle im-
plementing any eventual settlements, the process remains largely
unchanged. Operating under the assumption that ideological coher-
ence and political objectives motivate a cellular al-Qaeda in much
the same way that these aims animate a unified al-Qaeda, the terms
of the negotiation remain identical. American diplomacy may then
target individual terrorist groups as they are identified and leverage
the state’s assets to reach settlements with discrete cells. The re-
sources consumed in identifying these cells and negotiating with
their individual leaders is partially ameliorated by the ease of im-
plementation. That is to say that rather than rely on top-down chan-
nels of enforcement, individual settlements create limited groups to
monitor, rather than an entire organization to police. In sum,
however, diplomatic and rhetorical acrobatics aside, a cellular al-
Qaeda appears to fall largely outside of the framework this Note
185. See Zimmerman, supra note 110, at 14-15.
186. See supra Part III.
187. Carl Bialik, Shadowy Figure: Al Qaeda’s Size Is Hard to Measure, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
10, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405311190328570457656059312452
3206 [http://perma.cc/7AS9-7DLF] (“Analysts put the core membership at anywhere from 200
to 1,000. The next shell, of affiliated fighters or funders, is made up of thousands or tens of
thousands.”).
188. See Briggs, supra note 105, at 1.
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attempts to advance. Negotiating with individual cells is feasible on
paper but admittedly lacks real-world application.
For effectively negotiating with al-Qaeda, the hope, then, lies in
a unified organization or in some gradation stopping short of purely
cellular. As Zimmerman noted, al-Qaeda’s leadership may have
evolved on a temporal spectrum—beginning with a system of strong
command and control and then gradually devolving into a more
cellular organization.189 Even under this framework, it remains
difficult to identify at what point along the timeline modern al-
Qaeda occupies. If al-Qaeda’s structure falls short of the extreme
cellular tail of the spectrum, then negotiations with concentrated
pockets of leadership will prove possible. Summarily, once the Unit-
ed States clearly identifies its enemy, it should make every attempt
to isolate leadership—en masse or individually—and solicit conces-
sions. In this way, the United States might mirror the foreign policy
of the United Kingdom, which neutralized the disruptive forces of
the PIRA by engaging directly with terrorist leadership.
C. Limiting Fundamentalist Collateral
From its inception, the War on Terror has purported to focus on
eradicating al-Qaeda and stemming the rising tide of anti-American
sentiment globally.190 As a vehicle for accomplishing this task,
American leadership adopted a strategy by which the United States
would relentlessly attack al-Qaeda strongholds and win the “hearts
and minds” of the native populations through building trusted
networks.191 The United States Army and Marine Corps recognized
this latter strategy in its Counterinsurgency Field Manual, stating:
“Over time, successful trusted networks grow like roots into the
populace. They displace enemy networks, which forces enemies into
the open, letting military forces seize the initiative and destroy the
insurgents.”192 To that end, the manual advises avoiding “actions
189. Zimmerman, supra note 110, at 15.
190. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
191. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-24: COUNTERINSURGENCY para. A-26 (Dec. 15,
2006), available at http://perma.cc/S46R-FMBJ.
192. Id. The final draft before publication of 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual includ-
ed additional language recognizing this strategy. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-24:
COUNTERINSURGENCY (FINAL DRAFT—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION) para. 3-89 (June 2006),
available at http://perma.cc/6UXT-HUSJ (“Protracted popular war is best countered by
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that undermine trust” for fear of aiding the enemy.193 At the highest
levels of power in the United States, the principle of limiting the
negative publicity of a hardline stance on extremism remains a criti-
cal priority in the war on terror.194
In this arena, the United States might be well served by
emulating the English stance towards the Irish in the latter phases
of the Anglo-Irish conflict. As noted above, Parliament’s initial
crackdown on terrorism proved effective in quelling violence in the
short term but may have prolonged the fight as the actions fanned
the image of the English as oppressive imperialists and drew more
combatants into the fray.195 Yet, overtures of settlement and
carefully orchestrated military pressure prompted the PIRA
leadership to change their tune; rather than craft vitriolic speeches,
they turned to drafting ballot measures.196 Should the United States
sustain its military interventions and simultaneously offer the
possibility of settlement to al-Qaeda leadership, the cycle of anti-
American sentiment may ease and the probability of future terrorist
attacks may decline.
In light of this dualist approach—in which military might is
balanced against diplomacy through negotiation—it is important to
maintain a perspective on the challenges presented by the War on
Terror. Solutions that work today may fail tomorrow. Military inter-
vention may have been the proper course a decade ago—and may
still be the proper course today and into the future—but other
variables and alternatives may have their own role to play. As Pape
astutely notes, “Conquering countries may disrupt terrorist oper-
ations in the short term, but it is important to recognize that
occupation of more countries may well increase the number of
terrorists coming at us.”197 This Note suggests that opening the
channels of negotiation will alleviate the problems associated with
winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the populace.”).
193. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, supra note 191, at para. A-28.
194. President Barack Obama spoke to the need to limit fundamentalist rancor, addressing
the torture of detainees: “[Abiding by the Geneva Convention] ... will make us safer and will
help in changing hearts and minds in our struggle against extremists.” Elizabeth Dickinson,
A Bright Shining Slogan, FOREIGN POL’Y, Sept./Oct. 2009, at 29, available at http://perma.
cc/MB9N-WATW.
195. See supra Part III.
196. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
197. Pape, supra note 25, at 357.
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creating a class of future generations of would-be suicide bombers
and anti-American antagonists. 
V. COUNTERARGUMENTS
Augmentation of the status quo is frequently an uphill battle,
especially in the realm of American foreign policy.198 Any change
in the United States’s posture in the world, large or small, natu-
rally draws derision and detractors. The policy that this Note
advocates—resolving disputes with terrorist groups through nego-
tiations and other alternative means—may be considered both
drastic and imprudent. Valid arguments may be made in opposition
to this policy, and the most significant of these critiques will be
addressed squarely below. 
A. Sacrificing a Hard-Line Approach
American exceptionalism and military might justify a zero-toler-
ance approach to political extremism, and as such no ground should
be conceded to those who wish harm upon the United States, some
in dissent would argue. Although this supposition rings of well-
placed patriotism and leans on the supposed benefits of having a
bright-line prohibition against negotiating with terrorists, it falls far
short of effectuating successful policies and results. The hard-line
approach fastens itself to the perceived ability of the United States
to conduct perfect counterterrorism operations that eradicate an
organization whose membership is virtually unknown.199 The Ameri-
can government should not limit itself to such a specious strategy.
Sacrificing the hard line, comes the rejoinder, will weaken
America’s position in the world and paint a target on the homeland.
This Note suggests that the precise opposite result is to be
expected. By offering to engage with those who hold political
grievances—merited or not—minimizes the chances of future
attacks and dampens the passions of zealots. As addressed at length
198. See Illana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Status-Quo and Omission Biases, 5 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 49, 50 (1992) (discussing the preference of inaction over action); William
Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCER-
TAINTY 7, 9 (1988) (describing the lure of the status quo). 
199. See supra Part IV.
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in Part III, the British spent decades and hundreds of their soldiers’
lives in the admirable pursuit of quashing nationalist dissidents.
And when this policy experienced diminishing returns, Parliament
placed more diverse options on the table.200 The United States has
fought a ground war against terror largely informed by the
counterinsurgency experiences of its allies—the British in Malaya
and the French in Algeria.201 Why, then, should America eschew the
lessons of history outside of the context of war making?
Negotiating with terrorists supplements—and in no way dis-
places—the ability of the United States to destroy terrorist
networks. This Note, then, does not purport to discredit the efficacy
of resolute war or policy making. Rather, the proposition here ad-
vanced advocates for an additional means of effective engagement
with the enemy. Playing poker with half of a deck of cards is an
absurd endeavor. Yet, in the absence of a flexible approach to for-
eign policy, American leadership is playing precisely that game in
waging the War on Terror. 
B. Opening the Door
A second counterargument lodged against the premise of this
Note revolves around the notion that if the United States concedes
to one group of terrorists, the proverbial door will be open to other
like-minded dissidents. Hand in hand with hard-liners, those who
would dissent on these grounds suggest that rejecting negotiations
with al-Qaeda would likewise discourage other groups from using
extremist means to meet political ends. This argument is underpin-
ned by over-inclusive reasoning in that it assumes that a strategy
of negotiations involves mutually satisfactory compromise; the al-
ternative means of dispute resolution addressed in this Note do not
adhere to such a conciliatory model.
Rather, this Note has repeatedly emphasized the importance of
the state’s military and political leverage.202 Employing the nearly
200. See supra Part III.
201. Daniel T. Canfield, Algeria and Malaya: A Tale of Two Distinct and Dramatically
Different Counterinsurgency Campaigns, SMALL WARS J. (Aug. 26, 2013, 11:46 AM), http://
smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/algeria-and-malaya-a-tale-of-two-distinct-and-dramatically-
different-counterinsurgency-camp [http://perma.cc/9MHU-3MUT].
202. See supra Part III.A.
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limitless assets of the state in direct negotiations with one terrorist
group to achieve concessions in favor of the state is a fundamental
notion that undergirds the preceding analysis. As such, this finger-
on-the-scale mode of negotiation is a form hardly discouraged by
this Note. Critically, showing force at the negotiating table and
reaching resolutions favorable to America sends a potent signal to
other potential enemies and counterparties discouraging dissident
actions. 
Few would question America’s military capabilities in the War on
Terror. Even fewer would doubt America’s ability to outlast a move-
ment in global terrorism. Negotiating with dissident groups will
not weaken America’s position in the world and will not open the
floodgates of violent extremism. Negotiating with al-Qaeda does not
mean appeasing their extreme agendas and therefore does not
indicate a potential pathway for like-minded dissidents. Effectively
resolving the conflict with al-Qaeda defuses a grave threat to Ameri-
can security. Discrediting the solution posited in this Note—based
on the supposition that other threats may arise in the future—risks
the very security that negotiations would likely ensure.
C. Encouraging Recidivism
A final voice in the chorus of potential dissenting opinions might
contend that negotiating with al-Qaeda will merely encourage the
terrorist group to make more expansive demands. Thus, the argu-
ment goes, if America concedes to dissident demands through
negotiations once, the State essentially incentivizes future extremist
activity to coerce further allowances. This reasoning, although topi-
cally tempting, misreads both the “logic of suicide terrorism” and
the aims of this Note in equal measure.203 
To the former, terrorists pursue political agendas through ex-
treme means.204 By and large, acts of terror are perpetrated by ra-
tional individuals motivated by secular aims.205 Severe asymme-
tries between the dissident and the State prompt wanton violence,
as the option of direct physical engagement eludes the non-state
203. Pape, supra note 25, at 344.
204. Id. at 345.
205. Id. 
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belligerent.206 Removing the animating grievances—or at the very
least entertaining the prospect of a negotiated settlement—steals
the oxygen from the would-be terrorists’ lungs. Negotiating with
terrorists strikes at the very means of the logic of terrorism: Why
die for a cause when the cause may not require your life, but only
your signature?
To the latter, this Note advocates a position of calculated bar-
gaining that aims to neutralize—not placate—a nonstate enemy on
terms favorable to the State. The lessons drawn from the PIRA case
study expressly illustrate this logic.207 As a brief reminder,
Parliament refused to settle for anything less than a full cessation
of violence and the wholesale decommissioning of arms.208 This un-
bending stance forced the peace agreement to sputter and stall, but
served the crucial end of signaling to the PIRA that if a deal were to
be reached, it would be reached on the terms set by the Crown.209 In
negotiating with al-Qaeda, the United States should doubtlessly
employ the same firm message.
At base, this counterargument fallaciously conflates the real
danger of placating terrorists in the wake of acts of terrorism and
the imagined danger of conceding to terrorists on the margins at the
negotiating table. The former carries only risk for the State and
introduces an irredeemable stigma. Conversely, the latter places the
State in the position to capture a great deal of upside advantage
with relatively minimal cost. In sum, supplementing the American
arsenal with calculated negotiations and similar means of
alternative dispute resolution will work to end terrorism, not
engender it. 
CONCLUSION
The evolution of global terror requires the adoption of a durable
strategy. Acts of heinous extremism have been met by the sword
and the shield, but rarely with the pen. This Note advances the
simple proposition that America should shed its prohibition against
negotiating with terrorists and adopt a policy that centers on en-
206. Id. 
207. See supra Part III.
208. See supra Part III.A.
209. See supra Part III.A.
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gaging with the enemy. Utilizing theories of alternative dispute
resolution and leveraging the considerable assets of the State, the
United States may neutralize its dissident adversaries. To achieve
this end, this Note relied heavily on the British experience in North-
ern Ireland to elucidate three core concepts of engagement: (1)
harnessing the power of the State to tip the battlefield away from
extremists; (2) assessing the organizational components of the
enemy; and (3) minimizing the fundamentalist collateral of physical
engagement. Applying this tripartite framework to the relationship
between the United States and al-Qaeda formed the crux of this
Note with the aim of demonstrating the feasibility and efficacy of
such a reasoned strategy of alternative dispute resolution. By adopt-
ing a policy of engagement over isolation, the United States would
gain the opportunity to ensure a cessation of violence and the defeat
of menacing ideologues across the globe.
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